introduced an influential utility function for individuals in interpersonal contexts that captures self-centered inequity aversion. The power of this utility function lies in its good balance between parsimony and fit. This paper provides a preference foundation for exactly the model of Fehr and Schmidt (FS), so that the preference conditions satisfy exactly FS's balance between parsimony and fit. Remarkably, FS is a special case of Schmeidler's (1986 Schmeidler's ( , 1989 rank-dependent utility for decision under uncertainty.
Introduction
It has been recognized in economics that individuals often do not only care about their own payoff but also about the payoffs of others. Not only social planners, but also the members of society themselves care about the fairness and inequality of distributions of payoffs. Fehr and Schmidt (1999;  from now on referred to as FS) introduced a utility function that captures concern about fairness in the sense of inequity aversion. Individuals dislike both being worse off than others, and others being worse off than themselves. Nevertheless, this inequity aversion is not too extreme so that when all others receive nothing an individual does still want to maximize his own payoff. This paper gives a preference foundation of exactly FS.
Preference foundations give behavioral conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a model to hold. These conditions state the empirical meaning of a model in terms of observables. In empirical applications the model holds if and only if the behavioral conditions hold and it fails if and only if at least one of the behavioral conditions does not hold. Normatively, the model can be justified if one agrees that behavior should follow the behavioral conditions and it can be criticized otherwise. Thus, a preference foundation allows for a verification of the empirical validity and the normative appropriateness of a model.
It identifies the empirical content of a theoretical model directly in terms of observables.
Some recent studies provided preference foundations for models more general than FS (Neilson, 2006; Sandbu, 2008) . From these preference foundations it does not follow how we can verify whether preferences satisfy exactly the model of FS. Although these papers provide necessary conditions for FS to hold, they do not provide sufficient conditions and therefore do not exactly identify FS's empirical content.
1 Neilson (2006) considers general non-linear utility of payoff differences between one individual and the others. Neilson allows for, but does not identify a key feature of FS: that disadvantageous inequity is treated differently than advantageous inequity. Neilson's key condition is self-referent separability, which is similar to standard separability, but which treats one component, the payoff of the decision maker, differently. This self-referent separability is not sufficient to characterize FS, because it does neither differentiate between advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, nor does it require additivity. It provides a useful starting point for obtaining generalizations of FS to reckon, for instance, with nonlinear utility. Sandbu (2008) comes close to obtaining a preference foundation of FS. He does make a difference between advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, by imposing a separability condition on rank-maintaining distributions only. His homotheticity condition implies power utility. FS is the special case of Sandbu where the power of utility equals one.
Sandbu does not give a preference condition that guarantees a power of one. Thus, his conditions also are not sufficient to characterize exactly FS.
Instead of adding only few extra conditions to Sandbu's foundation in order to provide a preference foundation of exactly FS, this paper aims at minimizing the total number of preference conditions and at keeping them as simple as possible. Thus, we start anew and focus entirely on FS. This is done to reflect the empirical content of FS best. This approach may make the preference foundation appear obvious. Still, this paper is the first providing preference conditions that exactly characterize FS.
The second part of this paper proposes the rank-dependent model of Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1986 Schmeidler ( , 1989 as a natural generalization of FS 1 . Sandbu (2008) 
already
1 Similarly, Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) showed that the Gini-index in inequality measurement is a special 2 hinted towards this generalization, but we are the first to show exactly which weighting function in the rank-dependent model yields FS. The rank-dependent model was introduced to explain behavior for Knightean uncertainty that deviates from expected utility, and it spurred a whole stream of literature on ambiguity. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) used it to correct a theoretical mistake in the most influential theory of risk and uncertainty today: prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . For this new version of prospect theory it was possible to establish a preference foundation (Wakker and Tversky 1993) , proving its theoretical soundness. Such a preference foundation had been missing for the original prospect theory of 1979. This paper uses a refinement of Schmeidler's comonotonic additivity axiom to characterize FS. More precisely, we use a nonmonotonic version of Schmeidler's (1986) model, which was axiomatized by De Waegenaere and Wakker (2001) .
It is remarkable that Schmeidler's idea provides the basis of a very influential model not only in decision under uncertainty, but also in interpersonal contexts.
The Model
There are n + 1 individuals. Each individual i ∈ {0, . . . , n} receives a payoff x i ∈ R.
We model preferences of individual 0 over distributions x = (x 0 , . . . , x n ). The notation , , ≺, and ∼ is as usual.
Weak Ordering Weak ordering holds if is complete (x y or y x for all distributions x, y) and transitive.
case of rank-dependent utility. Gilboa (1989) proposed a model for intertemporal choice, which is also a special case of rank-dependent utility.
For every distribution x and every individual i = 1, . . . , n we define the deviation 
with α, β ≥ 0. We will next discuss the properties that preferences satisfy when FS holds.
We first introduce some more notation.
For all individuals i = 0, . . . , n and all distributions x the distribution µ i x denotes the distribution x with the payoff of individual i replaced by µ. Every payoff µ ∈ R is identified with a constant distribution yielding payoff µ for every individual. That is, instead of (µ, . . . , µ) we will often write µ to denote a constant distribution. From the context it will be clear whether µ denotes a single payoff or a constant distribution.
Constant Monotonicity Preferences satisfy constant monotonicity if µ ν if and only
if µ ≥ ν.
Constant monotonicity requires that, in the absence of inequality, higher payoffs are preferred to lower ones. If for a distribution x and a payoff µ we have x ∼ µ, then µ is a constant equivalent of x. Under constant monotonicity and transitivity every distribution can have at most one constant equivalent.
Constant Equivalence Constant equivalence holds if every distribution has a constant equivalent.
However unequal a distribution, under constant equivalence there is always a constant distribution that individual 0 finds equivalent. It can easily be verified that preferences satisfy constant monotonicity and constant equivalence if FS holds.
Two distributions x, y are covalent if for every individual i = 1, . . . , n the deviation has the same sign in both distributions:
Thus, if two distributions x and y are covalent, then it cannot be the case that an individual i gets strictly more than individual 0 in x and strictly less than individual 0 in y.
Covalent Additivity Covalent additivity holds if for all x, y, z that are pairwise covalent
Consider distributions that make it impossible for an individual to get more than individual 0 in one distribution and less in another one. Then increasing or decreasing the payoffs of all individuals by a given amount does not affect preferences over these distributions if covalent additivity holds. Next, consider redistributing the payoffs among individuals by common absolute amounts in all distributions such that individuals who received more than individual 0 before the redistribution do not receive less than individual 0 after the redistribution. Covalent additivity also requires that these redistributions should not affect preferences between distributions. As shown in the following observation, FS implies covalent additivity. We provide the proof in the main text, because it provides more insight into FS.
Observation 2.1 If FS holds, then covalent additivity holds.
Proof
Consider three distributions x, y, z that are pairwise covalent. We start by observing that
x and x + z are covalent. This can be seen as follows: if x i > x 0 then z i ≥ z 0 by covalence of x and z. It follows that x i + z i > x 0 + z 0 . The case x i < x 0 is similar. By a similar argument y and y + z are covalent.
Define the set of distributions S = {x, y, z, x + z, y + z}. We can split all individuals into three groups, J + , J − , and J 0 , as follows. J + consists of those individuals that do not receive less than individual 0 in any distribution in S and receive more than individual 0 in at least one distribution in S. J − consists of those individuals that do not receive more than individual 0 in any distribution in S and receive less than individual 0 in at least one distribution in S. J 0 consists of those individuals that receive the same payoff as individual 0 in every distribution in S. Since all distributions in S are pairwise covalent, there cannot be two distributions x, y ∈ S with x i > x 0 and y i < y 0 for some i. Thus there cannot be an individual that belongs both to J + and to J − . Thus, J + ∩ J − = ∅. Every individual j that belongs neither to J + nor to J − satisfies x j = 0 for all x ∈ S.
It follows that U (x) ≥ U (y), i.e.
if and only if
i.e. U (x + z) ≥ U (y + z). Thus, x y if and only if x + z y + z. (ii) individual 0 prefers advantages over disadvantages if and only if α ≥ β.
FS as a case of Rank-Dependent Utility
From the preference foundation of FS as given in the previous section, and from the formulation of Eq.1 deviations seem to play a crucial role in FS. What an individual cares about is his own payoff and the deviations of his own payoff from the payoffs of others.
An individual values his own payoff and the deviations and then aggregates the obtained values to obtain the value of the distribution.
FS can also be viewed as a special case of Schmeidler's (1986 Schmeidler's ( , 1989 We first define the weighting function W, which assigns a value to every subset of individuals. We assume that W (∅) = 0 and W ({0, . . . , n}) = 1. Consider a distribution
x. First we order the payoffs from best to worse, i.e. we take a permutation ρ on the set of individuals {0, . . . , n} such that x ρ(0) ≥ . . . ≥ x ρ(n) . The decision weight for individual ρ(j) is then defined by
for all j. Then rank-dependent utility (RDU) is given by 
Conclusion
This paper provided a preference foundation for the influential utility function that was introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . This utility function captures self-centered inequity aversion in the sense that individuals dislike both being worse off than others, and others being worse off than themselves. Remarkably, this utility function is a special case of Schmeidler's (1986 Schmeidler's ( , 1989 rank-dependent utility. Thus, rank-dependent utility is a natural generalization of FS, which may prove useful in modeling behavior in interpersonal contexts.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2.3
It was already shown in the main text that (i) implies (ii). We will now show that (ii) For all a ∈ R, all distributions x, and all individuals i we have that a i 0 is covalent with (x 0 ) i x. Therefore, by repeated application of covalent additivity we have
It follows that
From constant monotonicity we know that e represents preferences. 
